









Abstract		 As	a	philosophical	paradigm,	differential	heterogenesis	offers	us	a	novel	descriptive	vantage	with	which	to	inscribe	Deleuze’s	virtuality	within	the	terrain	of	“differential	becoming,”	conjugating	“pure	saliences”	so	as	to	parse	economies,	microhistories,	insurgencies,	and	epistemological	evolutionary	processes	that	can	be	conceived	of	independently	from	their	representational	form.	Unlike	Gestalt	theory’s	oppositional	constructions,	the	advantage	of	this	aperture	is	that	it	posits	a	dynamic	context	to	both	media	and	its	analysis,	rendering	them	functionally	tractable	and	set	in	relation	to	other	ob-jects,	rather	than	as	sedentary	identities.	Surveying	the	genealogy	of	differential	heterogenesis	with	particular	interest	in	the	legacy	of	Lautman’s	dialectic,	I	make	the	case	for	a	reading	of	the	Deleuzean	virtual	that	departs	from	an	event-oriented	approach,	galvanizing	Sarti	and	Citti’s	dynamic	a	priori	vis-à-vis	Deleuze’s	philosophy	of	difference.	Specifically,	I	posit	differential	heterogenesis	as	frame	with	which	to	examine	our	contemporaneous	epistemic	shift	as	it	relates	to	multi-scalar	computa-tional	modeling	while	paying	particular	attention	to	neuro-inferential	modes	of	inductive	learning	and	homologous	 cognitive	 architecture.	 Carving	 a	bricolage	between	Mark	Wilson’s	work	on	 the	“greediness	of	scales”	and	Deleuze’s	“scales	of	reality”,	this	project	threads	between	static	ecologies	and	active	externalism	vis-à-vis	endocentric	frames	of	reference	and	syntactical	scaffolding.	
		





jects	of	mathematical	theories	but	the	notions	that	the	development	of	these	theories	invoke.	These	ideas	translate	a	“non-sensible	reality”	from	which	mathematical	theories	are	taken	in	order	to	“describe	and	duplicate	an	ideal	reality”	(Reynolds	2010:	226).	With	Lautman’s	dialectic	construction	we	see	the	edifice	of	two	limit	conditions:	(i)	the	time	of	the	real,	where	we	can	have	physical	processes	which	are	generated	(and,	thus,	are	akin	to	chronologies);	(ii)	Platonic	Ideas	outside	of	time,	which	flow	in	an	immanent	mode.1	Lautman	was	 somewhat	 dissatisfied	with	 Plato’s	 dialectical	 conception	 of	 relation	 be-tween	Ideas	and	the	material	reality	through	which	they	are	realized,	augmenting	Plato	via	Heidegger.	Lautman’s	ultimate	claim	is	that	a	mathematical	entity’s	ontological	status	does	not	depend	upon	the	existence	of	“apparently	arbitrary	decisions	to	explore	some	sets	of	axioms	but	not	others”—rather,	it	is	the	case	that	“mathematicians	create	new	mathematical	structures	in	the	course	of	answering	questions	latent	in	the	underlying	extra-mathematical	dialectical	 order”	 (Larvor	 2011:	 199).	 Thus,	 a	 kind	 of	 primordial	 mathematical	 creation	emerges	through	the	dialectical	division	and	definition	of	differences,	the	unfolding	of	the	ontological	vis-à-vis	the	concrete	(or	ontic).2		Upending	the	hierarchical	relationship	of	the	infinitesimal	dialectic	as	a	dyadic	relation-ship	that	directly	determines	the	contingency	between	form	and	matter	(or	local	and	global),	Deleuze’s	 renderings	 of	 Lautman’s	 dialectic	 repurpose	 this	 relation	 as	 a	 scalar	 problem.	Thus,	 this	demonstrates	 the	 legacy	and	 influence	of	Lautman’s	asymptotic	approximation	upon	 Deleuze’s	 conception	 of	 undetermined	 differentials,	 or	 “infinitesimals”.	 Akin	 to	 the	Heideggerian	interpretation	of	Aletheia	(ἀλήθεια),	or	“unconcealedness”—whereby	the	re-vealing	of	Being	is	a	dynamic	differential	process—Lautman’s	rejection	of	truth	as	end-os-mosis	(final	resemblance),	in	refusing	the	adequacy	of	the	Idea	to	the	real,	engages	in	a	pro-cess	of	de-substantialization.	Thus	and	so,	displacement	becomes	 the	 foundational	meta-physical	relationship	to	binding	multiplicitous	of	form	with	matter;	Lautman’s	diagrammatic	“phase	space”	of	rigorous	structural	appropriation,	where	energetic	possibilities	govern	col-lective	behavior,	portends	Deleuze’s	fully	immanent	“virtual	multiplicities”.	




As	 perhaps	made	most	 explicitly	 clear	 by	 Deleuze’s	 disjunctive	 synthesis,	 this	 “phase	space”	invokes	the	possibilities	of	a	system	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	its	“vector	field”.3	That	is,	these	“virtual	multiplicities”	are	akin	to	concrete	universals	rather	than	the	Aristotelian	scenography	of	“essences”	(i.e.,	abstract	archetypes).	Just	as	it	is	incorrect	to	reduce	“virtual	multiplicities”	to	the	“possible”,	so	too	the	“virtual”:		 […]	can	be	distinguished	from	the	‘possible’	from	at	least	two	points	of	view.	From	a	cer-tain	point	of	view,	in	fact,	the	possible	is	the	opposite	of	the	real,	it	is	opposed	to	the	real;	but,	in	quite	a	different	opposition,	the	virtual	is	opposed	to	the	actual	[….]	The	possible	has	no	reality	(although	it	may	have	an	actuality);	conversely,	the	virtual	is	not	actual,	but	as	such	possesses	a	reality	[….]	Here	again	Proust’s	formula	best	defines	the	states	of	virtuality:	‘real	without	being	actual,	ideal	without	being	abstract.’	(Deleuze	1991:	96)		Deleuze	thus	distinguishes	the	virtual	from	the	possible	as	what	is	irreducible	to	the	actual	but,	nonetheless,	is	granted	the	privileged	status	of	“immateriality”	while,	simultaneously,	being	fully	real.	These	virtual	multiplicities	are	crucial	to	our	conception	of	differential	het-erogenesis,	shining	a	light	on	the	non-observable	relation	between	differential	elements,	a	relation	signifying	lines	of	individuation.	These	singularities	serve	as	points	of	attraction	for	a	system,	which	are	themselves	never	actualized—as	ideal	singularities,	they	“enjoy	an	‘im-material’	status	insofar	as	they	define	the	tendencies	composing	a	vector	field	without	being	themselves	ever	actualized,	functioning	thus	as	the	intensive	‘differentiator’	responsible	for	spatio-temporal	individuation”	(Sacilotto	2020:	38).	The	“attractive”	facet	of	these	singular-ities	serves	as	warning	to	not	confuse	Deleuze’s	disjunctive	synthesis	with	Heraclitean	eter-nal	flux,	where	world-order	(kosmos)	is	caught	in	constant	and	significant	change.	Further	distinguishing	Deleuze’s	virtual	as	a	twofold	of	body	and	desire,	we	see	that	it	is	immersed	within	the	active	unity	of	interior	change,	with	its	unconscious	“factory”	steeped	in	the	(dia-lectical)	process	of	both	being	the	ground	for	generation	and	being	generated,	itself	(Deleuze	1990:	90).4	However,	considering	the	aforementioned	gradient	of	difference	between	possi-bility	 and	 actuality,	 there	 is	 a	 necessary	 active	 difference	 in	 kind	 between	 virtuality	 and	












transcendent	factor	that	connects	machines	and,	second,	there	is	no	distinction	between	man	and	nature;	what	both	these	factors	demonstrate	is	that	“process”	evinces	how	machinic	be-ing	“happens	everywhere”;	the	most	important	aspect	of	the	Deleuzean	machinic	process	is	that	the	process,	itself,	is	not	an	“end	in	itself,	nor	must	it	be	confused	with	an	infinite	per-petuation	of	itself”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1983:	15).	This	evidences	that	the	schizo-process	is	not	a	continuous,	universal,	or	underlying	event	 that	exists	 in	addition	to	machinology.	 In	both	Bryant	and	Kleinherenbrink’s	formulation,	Deleuze’s	externality	thesis	states	that	all	entities	have	an	extra-relational	aspect,	a	residue	of	excess	and	superfluity.	Devoid	of	a	uni-versal	background,	externality	is	necessarily	composed	of	a	processes	that	consists	of	breaks	and	 stops/cuts,	 whereby	 permanence,	 emergence,	 production,	 generation,	 and	 change	emerge	as	passive	syntheses	of	time:		 [t]hey	describe	how	one	entity	relates	to	another	(connection),	how	it	manages	to	do	so	while	remaining	irreducible	(disjunction),	and	how	new	entities	are	created	(conjunc-tion).	They	are	‘temporal’	because	they	account	for	how	things	happen;	‘passive’	because	they	 are	 independent	of	memory,	 understanding	will,	 recognition	 and	 consciousness;	‘productive’	because	they	account	for	the	forging	of	relations;	‘registrative’	because	they	account	for	the	alteration	of	individual	essences;	and	‘consumptive	because	they	account	for	the	birth	and	death	of	entities.	These	syntheses	are	not	successive,	but	always	‘over-lap’[….]	A	human	spotting	a	friend	is	a	case	of	the	 three	syntheses,	but	so	is	a	meteor	striking	the	moon,	or	my	finger	striking	my	keyboard.	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	41)		Recall	 that,	 according	 to	Deleuze’s	 philosophical	 system,	 the	 “actual”	 indicates	 assem-blages	as	they	are	experienced	by	other	machines	while,	conversely,	the	“virtual”	denotes	the	extra-relational	(or	non-relational)	reality	of	machines.	Kleinherenbrink’s	fourfold	sys-tem	is	the	result	of	a	further	qualification	resulting	from	the	bifurcation	of	the	actual/virtual	
with	 the	 One/multiple;	 as	 it	 concerns	 the	 non-relational	 unity	 of	what	 Deleuze	 calls	 “the	body”,	we	are	thus	particularly	interested	in	what	remains	external	to	relations	between	ma-




serving	 as	 an	 idempotent	 and	 indexical	 resemblance	 of	 something	 other	 than	 an	 object	(Rancière	1998:	525-536).		The	virtual	body,	for	Deleuze,	is	never	pronounced	in	actual	relations,	which	is	to	say	that	it	cannot	be	integrated	into	manifestations	qua	relations	and,	therefore,	it	is	the	virtual	that	is	enveloped	by	its	relations.	Despite	bodies	are	irreducible	to	relational	manifestations,	these	relations,	nevertheless,	 transpire	vis-à-vis	 appearance.	Therefore,	despite	being	a	 “closed	vessel”,	the	virtual	twofold	is	not	immune	to	the	evental	nature	of	the	world	(Kleinheren-brink	2019:	97).	Thus,	on	the	one	hand	there	are	the	“the	virtuals	that	define	the	immanence	of	the	transcendental	field”	and,	on	the	other,	“the	possible	forms	that	actualize	them	and	transform	 them	 into	 something	 transcendent”	 (Deleuze	 2005:	 32).	 The	 process	 of	differential	actualization	thus	follows	the	plane	of	the	virtual,	which	gives	assemblages	their	particular	reality.	Deleuze	plucks	genetic	encoding	for	his	case	study	whereby	such	“differential	relations”	unfold	and	through	which	virtual	multiplicities	are	subsequently	composed	into	unique	ac-tualities.	Accordingly,	 the	axes	of	 the	non-algebraic	differential	 tensors	“are	 incarnated	at	once	in	a	species	and	the	organic	parts	of	which	it	[morphogenesis]	is	composed”	(Deleuze	1994:	206).	Similarly,	Sarti	and	Citti’s	model	of	differential	heterogenesis	provides	us	with	a	mathematical	description	of	 the	emergence	and	creation	of	(particular)	 forms,	whereby	a	
priori	conditions	are	not	definitively	predetermined	but,	instead,	akin	to	the	interference	of	two	wave	packet	“colliding”	during	quantum	superposition.5	Hence,	differential	heterogen-esis	allows	us	to	consider	the	becoming	process	of	 the	a	priori	without	committing	to	the	Kantian	transcendental	decision	which	contends	that	substance	is	a	stable	but	uncontended	and	unreachable	a	priori	category	of	mind	that	is	imposed	on	the	chaotic	manifold	of	move-ment	into	form.	Instead,	while	differential	morphogenesis	does,	indeed,	retain	the	“boundary	concept”	of	the	Kantian	noumena—after	all,	we	must	infer	the	pre-conceptual	differential	space’s	existence	and,	thus,	it	remains	as	a	“thought-object”	(ens	rationis)—it	is	freed	from	Kant’s	apophatic/negative	and	regulative	use.	This	is	akin	to	protein	encoding	in	DNA,	where	DNA	and	RNA	nucleotide	sequences	"translate"	the	amino	acids	that	they	represent.	Like	the	possibility	space	of	genetic	encoding,	differential	heterogenic	composition	grants	lays	the	conditions	for	immanent	fixity,	the	dynamic	space	of	possibility	producing	“the	differential	







The	Differential’s	Processual	Relations		For	Deleuze,	the	transcendental	illusion	is	generated	in	the	behaviour	through	which	ob-jects	relate	to	one	another	and,	consequentially,	how	“the	states	‘experienced’	by	a	system	are	treated	as	other	objects	 themselves,	rather	than	system-specific	entities	generated	by	the	organization	of	the	object	itself”	(Bryant	2011:	102).	According	to	this	construction,	en-tities	“have	their	manifestations	in	relations	to	others,	plus	their	non-relational	interior	con-stitution”	 (42).	 This	 relation,	 which	 Bryant	 terms	 an	 “onto-cartography”,	 is	 formulated	around	the	relational	appearance	of	entities	vis-à-vis	other	relations,	as	opposed	to	their	pri-vate	(virtual)	being	(Bryant	2008).	Bryant’s	reading	of	Deleuze	emphasizes	Deleuze’s	cri-tique	of	presence—the	belief	 that	 the	experience	of	an	entity	 is	 identical	 to	 its	Being—by	showing	 how	Deleuze	 disentangles	presentist	 (or	 event-oriented)	 philosophical	 positions	that	reduce	reality	to	the	thoughts	concerning	it.		Following	Lautman,	Kleinherenbrink,	and	Bryant,	we	can	contextualize	Deleuze’s	differ-ential	entity	as	a	means	of	characterizing	machinic	manifestation	while	prioritizing	relation,	itself.6	By	invoking	Sarti	and	Citti,	we	can	further	note	that	differential	heterogenesis	as	such	does	not	position	or	present	the	“thing-in-manifestation”	as	reducible	to	subject-object	in-ternal	conditions	(e.g.,	the	perceptual	experience	of	an	object	and	its	qualities).	Rather,	the	manifestation	of	an	entity	is	never	a	single,	homogenous	milieu	or	phenomenon	but	(differ-entially)	split	between	qualitative	rhythms/processes—nested	within	its	agentive	material	dimension—and	the	content	of	its	experience	(Bryant	2014:	96).	This	bifurcation	delineates	“the	qualities	characterizing	an	experience	on	the	one	hand,	and	on	the	other	hand	the	uni-fied	thing—immanent	to	the	relation—of	which	they	are	qualities”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	45).		What	then,	is	to	be	said	of	the	non-relational	or	private	interior	of	entities?	In	accordance	with	Deleuze’s	terms,	the	interior	being	of	a	machine	is	necessarily	unified	with	its	multiplic-ity,	preventing	continuity.	The	diverse	world	of	experience	is	thus	regarded	not	as	a	single,	continuous,	or	homogenous	mass	but	an	antecedent.	In	short,	externality	evinces	a	strict	dis-continuity	between	interior	being	qua	immediacy	and	interior	being	qua	exigency.	





dental	illusion.	As	Bryant	remarks,	the	“virtual	works	vertically	from	the	implicate	to	the	ex-plicate”	 (2011:	 64).	 Similarly,	 Deleuze’s	 conceptualization	 of	 genes,	 which	 are	 linked	 to-gether	 in	 interdependent	 and	 complex	 reticulations	 and	 interdependencies—an	 “endo-structure”—	underscores	how	virtuality	shapes	the	conditions	that	the	form	of	the	organism	of	becoming	will	take,	where	differential	“becoming”	in	no	way	resembles	the	organism	(with	organism	as	a	metonym	for	“actualization”).		As	Deleuze	remarks	in	Difference	and	Repetition,	“[t]he	virtual	is	opposed	not	to	the	real	but	to	the	actual.	The	virtual	is	fully	real	in	so	far	as	it	is	virtual”	(1994:	208).	This	fundamen-tal	 tenant	of	 virtuality	demonstrates	 that	 the	differential	 is	 coordinated	by	 a	manifold	of	points	and	nodes,	channeled	within	processes	“yielding	a	variety	of	actual	entities	with	very	different	metric	properties”	(De	Landa,	in	Duffy	2006:	246).7	Moving	beyond	topology,	we	can	 also	 note	 that	 rather	 than	 the	macro-political	 rigid	 terrain	 (of	Marx	 and	Durkheim),	Deleuze’s	differential	micro-sociology	probes	insurrectional	political	zones	of	indiscernibly,	such	as	the	“subrepresentative”	realm	of	the	“masses	and	the	quantum	flows	of	belief”	and	the	“desire	and	fear	that	govern	them”	(Holland,	in	Somers-Hall	et	al.	2018:	173).	In	short,	Deleuze’s	“body	without	organs”	denotes	the	non-relational	unity	of	a	machine,	whether	it	concerns	surface	structure	or	sociologically-considered	political	behavior.	If,	then,	it	is	not	actualities	that	figure	into	distinction,	how	do	we	distinguish	this	body	from	that	body?	This	“desire”	is	what	renders	relational	manifestations	and,	therefore,	it	is	defined	in	terms	of	power;	“desire”	is	the	virtual	latent	content	empowering	the	manifest	content	of	actuality—thus,	Deleuze’s	conception	of	the	machine	is	as	a	“desiring-machine”	(Deleuze	1977:	132).	The	machine’s	“desire”	is	its	private	reality,	which	cannot	be	directly	experienced	 by	 anything	 else	 and	 is	 not	 empirically	 available;	 nor	 is	 it	 encountered	 and,	therefore,	it	is	transcendental—machinic	desire	is	what	gives	actuality	to	a	machine	without,	itself,	being	such	an	actuality.		This	conception	of	“desire”,	much	like	the	body	without	organs,	belongs	to	the	virtual	as-pect	of	entities	and	indexes	the	unconscious	relation	of	physics/physical	relations	through	the	aperture	of	 internal	matter	(Deleuze	1994:	106).	For,	 if	 the	externality	 thesis	holds,	 it	means	that	there	is	necessarily	something	about	entities	outside	of	such	relations—i.e.,	an	internality,	which	Deleuze	defines	as	“[s]ubmolecular,	unformed	matter”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	2005:	503).	The	virtual	corresponds	to	puissance,	a	particular	articulation	of	power	that	is	non-relational	 and	 can	 be	 experienced	 and	 described	 indirectly—for	 Aristotle,	 this	 com-prised	 a	 (secondary)	 understanding	 of	 the	 potentiality	 of	 the	 many	 which,	 unlike	 the	





entiated	 without	 being	 differentiated,	 and	 complete	 without	 being	 entire”	 (Deleuze	 1994:	214).	Due	to	this	externality	thesis,	relations	are	external	to	terms	and	every	machine	has	an	excess	that	seeks,	or	“desires”,	an	extra-relational	“beyond”—therefore,	excess	is	differenti-ated,	as	Deleuze’s	system	is	not	one	of	machinic	univocity	but	one	where	every	machine	is	a	
multiplicity:	“singular	without	being	a	unit	of	something	and	diverse	without	being	a	diver-sity	of	things	[….]	Desire	is	the	private	reality	of	entities	and	in	this	sense	[….]	internal	reality	is	a	machine’s	matter,	its	substance,	and	its	essence”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	165).		As	Deleuze’s	virtual	is	necessarily	defined	as	a	strict	part	of	the	real	object,	its	“desire”	stitches	together	essence,	substance,	and	matter.8	For	Deleuze,	following	Husserl	once	more,	essence	refers	not	to	a	simple	object	of	experience	but	to	the	body’s	internal	reality,	distinct	from	“sensible	things”	and,	thus,	is	“morphological”,	“nomadic”,	and	“vagabond”	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1983:	167).		Much	like	the	non-localizable	nature	of	observation	as	it	relates	to	differential	heterogen-esis,	there	is	a	peculiar	vagabond	nature	to	the	virtual’s	twofold	property	of	“being	and	not	being	where	they	are,	wherever	they	go”	(Deleuze	1997:	126).	It	is	designated	as	such	be-cause	 the	 virtual	 is	 intensive,	while	 an	 actuality	 is	 always	 extensive	 and,	 thus,	 articulated	through	precisely	where	and	when	it	is,	encountered	in	relations	and	nowhere	else—“[m]y	keyboard	is	beneath	my	hand	and	on	my	desk.	A	song	is	in	a	room.	An	organ	is	in	an	organism.	Soldiers	fight	in	wars	and	drones	hover	over	weddings”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	169-170).	Drawing	 from	 Deleuze,	 our	 transcendental	 (i.e.,	 the	 transcendental	 of	 differential	






















supervening	upon	proletarianization	 (Stiegler	2019);	 for	new	media	 theory	and	software	studies,	the	differential	provides	us	with	a	point	of	entry	so	as	to	examine	newfound	incom-putable	infinities,	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	Halting	probability	problem	(Parisi	2013;	Fazi	2018).	In	philosophy	of	physics,	this	conception	of	the	differential	allows	us	to	examine	the	issue	of	multiscalar	analysis	in	modern	computational	modeling	techniques,	helping	us	rec-ognize	 the	distortions	and	vagaries	 in	 theory-as-approximation	 (i.e.,	 describing	materials	that	reveal	large	amounts	of	significant	structure	at	intermediate	size	scales;	Wilson	2018).	There	are,	indeed,	a	number	of	shared	(albeit	uniquely	stratified)	concerns	by	these	con-temporary	posthumanist	thinkers,	wherein	the	goal	of	recasting	aesthetic	questions	is	con-jured	by	the	frame	of	epistemology	while	knowledge	is	subsumed	under	the	category	of	spec-ulative	(and,	often,	non-human)	naturalism.9	Stiegler’s	conception	of	exteriorized	hypomne-mata	(media	mnemonics)	and	epiphylogenesis	(the	mutually	constitutive	relation	between	technics	and	organism)	is	circumscribed	to	the	exteriorized	interiority	of	the	individual	in	an	 anthropic	 framework	 (exosomatization).10	 Here,	 metastable	 distribution	 is	 lineally	fielded	across	nested	retentional	hierarchies	and	mereological	protentional	resonances—Stiegler	conceives	of	Deleuze’s	virtuality	as	the	point	of	singularity	(or	a	“minimum”)	through	a	manifold	series	of	metric	properties	that	unfold	historically.	Hui	orients	this	in	a	unique	direction,	by	demonstrating	how	Kant’s	Critique	of	Judgment	(1790)	is	the	first	philosophical	work	to	made	the	organism	explicit	and	paradigmatic	as,	for	Kant,	mechanical	laws	are	not	sufficient	to	explain	contingency	and	the	teleology	of	nature.	By	co-opting	Schelling’s	con-ception	of	freedom	as	the	improbable,	or	absolute	contingency,	Hui	recapitulates	nature	as	neither	something	inside	us	nor	outside	of	us	but,	instead,	as	it	actively	abolishes	subject-




object	dualism(s).	Hui	plucks	Schelling’s	system	to	proffer	recursivity	as	a	“self-contained	whole”	(Hui	2019:	55).	This	marks	the	philosophical	crux	of	organicism	as	a	foundation	for	thinking	 of	 an	 open	 system	 through	meta-scalar	 self-organization,	 anticipating	 biological	models	 such	 as	 Ilya	 Prigogine’s	 dissipative	 system	 and	 Francisco	 Varela	 and	 Humberto	Maturana’s	autopoiesis.	Schelling’s	philosophy	of	nature	also	informs	Hui’s	organismic	con-ception	of	spatiality,	where	each	organism	is	understood	as	“self-contained”	but	also	always	“influenced	by	other	organisms,	so	such	an	 ‘internal	 finality’	affirms	a	structural	 ‘external	finality’”	(163).	Through	Schelling,	Hui	destabilizes	the	conception	of	our	world	as	a	closed	and	static	material	system.11	Hui	has	recently	taken	interest	in	the	positive	use	of	the	Absolute	in	Meillassoux	as	artic-ulated	in	the	“inhuman”	as	an	“affirmation	of	a	nonhuman	way	of	production	of	knowledge	and	systematization”	through	reiteration,	with	this	reaching	towards	the	potential	of	infini-tude	(as	exemplified	by	mathematical	practice;	263).	For	Meillassoux,	the	kenotype	is	pure	identity	and	 indexes	 that	which	 is	outside	of	 the	 field	of	 sensible	 repetition.	Hui	demon-strates	how	Meillassoux’s	reiteration—the	ontology	of	empty	signs—in	fact	affirms	compu-tationalism.	Bolstered	by	Gödel,	Hui’s	conception	of	the	inhuman	attempts	to	transcend	sys-tematization,	rather	than	reaffirm	it,	with	contradiction	as	the	undecidable	rather	than	that	which	is	overcome	in	(historical-temporal)	reality.	It	is	with	the	looming	overhang	of	prefor-mation	that	the	inhuman	–Hui’s	cosmological	arrangement–finds	it	collective	closure	with	differential	heterogenesis’	abstract	morphologies	devoid	of	corporeal	value,	i.e.,	pure	salien-
cies	(Sarti	&	Barbieri	2018:	56).	If	Lautman’s	penetration	of	the	real	by	intelligence	diffused	differential	geometry	as	a	cos-mological	vector,	Jean	Petitot’s	philosophical	interest	in	mathematization	vis-à-vis	the	crit-ico-phenomenological	tradition	permits	us	to	go	beyond	a	biological	understanding	of	mor-phogenesis.	This	is	why	Sarti,	Citti,	and	Piotrowski,	contra	Saussure’s	initial	impulse	to	dis-miss	“the	sound”	as	“gnoseological	obstruction”,	recompose	phenomenology	into	the	becom-ing	 of	 meaning	 (Sarti	 et	 al.	 2019:	 15).	 Similarly,	 directing	 the	 real	 along	 mathematical	




morphogenesis,	Petitot’s	work	on	the	superimposition	of	receptive	fields	echoes	reconceives	of	the	differential	as	a	media	mnemonic	with	which	we	are	allowed	“to	test”	the	real	(1987:	20).	Petitot’s	most	recent	work	with	eigenvalues	uses	Alan	Turing’s	“reaction-diffusion	dif-ferential	equations”	to	parse	Newtonian	mechanics	alongside	kinetic	chemical	information;	according	to	Petitot,	scalar	sets	demystify	the	differential’s	ability	to	evoke	the	“breakdown	of	symmetry	and	homogeneity”	(2012:	22).	Petitot’s	writing	on	morphogenetic	substances	also	demonstrates	how	there	exist	many	homologies	of	organization	between	different	bio-logical	species	that	are	determined	along	histological	patterns,	fortifying	Sarti	and	Citti’s	Si-mondonian-biological	conception	of	organology-formation	qua	differential	heterogenesis.	Fielding	Sarti	and	Citti’s	terrain	of	becoming-differential	and	the	computational	linkages	between	 geometries,	 symmetries,	 and	 geodesics	 central	 to	 understanding	 the	 physical	world,	one	may	consider	Simondon’s	“intraperceptive	image”,	the	pre-condition	to	percep-tion,	 and	Deleuze’s	 “Aionic”	 temporality	 of	 the	 third	 synthesis	 of	 time.12	 Aside	 from	 self-touching	haptic	conceptions	of	 the	self,	such	differentials	are	also	 linked	to	self-reflective	mental	portraiture	on	the	“infraceptive”	scale,	or	that	which	is	sensuously	“seized	within”	(kinesthetic/proprioceptive),	where	the	fold	touches	upon	itself,	providing	the	differential	with	a	breakage	point	within	the	ubiquity	of	universality	such	that	it	can	locate	itself.	From	nano-technologies	to	the	subjective	experiences	that	emerge	out	of	the	differential,	such	link-ages	may	provide	an	imprint	of	experience	that	pertain	to	making	sense	out	of	what	were	once	regarded	as	provisional	“invariances”.13		




Anisotropic	Materials	&	Multi-Scalar	Media	Modeling			The	infinitesimal	is	not	simply	a	topological	question	of	division	in	Euclidean	space,	per-ception,	and	observation	but,	as	Sarti	and	Citti	note,	concerns	how	neurogeometries—such	as	Petitot’s	sub-Riemannian	geometry—	demonstrate	“differential	constraints”	that	are	not	necessarily	 deduced	 from	 more	 sophisticated	 structures	 (2019:	 11).14	 Just	 as	 semantic	meaning	is	always	produced	as	a	pragmatic	experimentation	of	singular	transformation	but	never	given,	differential	neurogeometry	enumerates	how	a	mathematical	description	for	the	emergence	and	creation	of	conditional	forms	is	not	configured	as	an	a	priori	given	within	a	set	(Sauvagnargues	2018:	17).	Petitot’s	work	on	vision	and	image	processing,	which	builds	upon	David	Mumford's	geometrical	formatting	of	visual	input,	exhibits	how	neurogeometry	testifies	that	“phase	space”	is	a	“pure	intuition”	that	is	non-conceptual,	antepredicative,	and	a	prejudicative.	Homologous	to	how	Sarti	and	Citti’s	differential	heterogenesis	provides	us	with	a	mathematical	description	of	the	dynamic	production	of	a	priori	“phase	space”,	neuro-geometries	are	specified	by	a	cognitive	corollary	to	virtual-actual	becoming,	where	the	key	role	is	that	of	scale:		 Perceptual	geometry	results	from	the	integration	of	local	detections	by	receptive	fields	which	have	a	certain	width	and	so	occurs	at	a	certain	scale,	i.e.	with	a	certain	resolution.	Perceptual	differential	geometry	must	therefore	be	multiscale,	while	conventional	dif-ferential	geometry	corresponds	to	the	idealization	of	infinite	resolution.	(Petitot	2008:	13;	emphasis	added)		To	best	articulate	this	problem,	let	us	take	into	consideration	a	simple	steel	beam.	At	the	highest	 size	 scales—following	 Hookean	 first-order	 linear	 approximation—steel	 stretches	and	compresses	down	to	approximately	10μm.	At	10μm,	the	grain	structure	within	steel	be-comes	highly	pertinent,	as	these	grain	structures	and	their	components	begin	to	stretch	and	compress	according	to	a	more	complex	set	of	rules	than	larger-scale	steel.	Within	each	of	these	component	grains	there	are	a	number	of	“laminate	layers	which	rub	against	one	an-other	in	complicated	ways	[….]	until	we	reach	the	tiny	crystal	lattices	of	the	molecular	level,	whose	 orderly	patterns	 are	 interrupted	 by	 higher-scale-irregularities	 called	 dislocations”	(Wilson	2018:	202-203).	 It	 is	here	 that	 the	differential	 equations	 that	 regulate	behaviors	nominally	occurring	in	the	“infinitesimal”	level	become	central.	The	specifications	relevant	for	the	differential	equations	within	physics	are	generally	obtained	by	scaling	higher-level	behaviors	downwards,	until	some	simpler	 infinitesimal	 level	 is	reached.15	Steel,	however,	presents	a	problem	to	such	benchmark	scaling	assumptions,	as	its	behaviours	stop	scaling	at	




the	cutoff	of	~10μm.	While	small	sections	of	steel	behave	more	or	less	identically	at	all	scale	lengths	above	this	level,	to	capture	the	component	grain	behaviours	after	10μm	accurately,	we	are	required	to	model	it	in	a	more	laminate-based	manner.		What,	exactly,	then	is	the	“greediness	of	scales”?	While	Representative	Volume	Element	(RVE)16	sub-models	can	be	examined	on	account	of	contemporary	scientific	observational-measurement	 tools	 (and,	 in	 particular,	 advances	 in	 computer	 simulation	 that	 attempt	 to	overcome	descriptive	clashes),	it	is	the	problem	of	data	amalgamation	that	prevents	“prac-titioners	 from	profiting	 from	this	collective	knowledge	 in	a	straightforward	way”	(203)17.	This	 is	 because,	 using	 RVE	 scale-focused	modelling	 via	 differential	 equations	 in	 bottom-down	fashion	(i.e.,	reaching	towards	the	infinitesimal),	amalgamation	presents	a	conflict	re-garding	the	direct	descriptive	incompatibilities	that	arise	when	we	use	the	same	vocabulary	with	respects	to	properties	that	a	material	(such	as	steel)	displays	on	small-scale	levels.18	The	“greediness	of	scales”	summons	the	central	concerns	of	differential	heterogenesis,	producing	a	collective	closure	between	the	semantic	and	the	topological	concerns	that	Sarti	and	Citti	elude	to.	The	central	problem	arises	on	the	differential	terrain:	differential	equa-tions	that	are	appropriate	to	two	levels	of	sub-modelling	necessitate	that	the	narrowly-con-strained	rules	concerning	stretching	and	compression	must	remain	applicable	down	to	the	
zero-length	scale.	Hence,	the	“greediness	of	scales”	conflict	is	born	due	to	syntactic	dishar-mony:	the	differential	equation	model	must	account	for	all	the	lower-size	scales	available	to	reach	the	infinitesimal	level,	which	is	where	differential	equations	articulate	their	stipula-tions.	However,	due	to	the	syntactical	discordance	concerning	the	material’s	behaviour	be-yond	a	cutoff	level,	we	have	to	content	with	inconsistent	claims	concerning	the	very	same	part	of	a	material,	media,	or	object.	This	may	remind	the	reader	of	Sellars’	“pink	cube”	prob-lem,	where	an	ice	cube’s	colour	is	observed	as	ultimately	homogenous	because	its	“manifest	image”	presents	itself	to	us	as	a	“pink	continuum”	in	“all	the	regions	of	which,	however	small,	are	pink”	(Sellars	1966:	26).	The	concept	of	“pink”,	however,	demands	that	its	applications	
scale	continuously	downwards	to	the	infinitesimal	level,	wherein	this	“manifest	image”,	or	the	image	of	as	it	is	plainly	conceived	of	to	the	naked	eye,	is	set	in	contrast	to	what	we	know	through	scientific	measurement	or,	in	Sellars’	parlance,	“the	scientific	image”.	Despite	Wilson	





is	concerned	with	continuum	physics	and	the	stipulations	behind	a	scale’s	executing	a	bot-tom-down	monopoly—specifically	as	it	concerns	requirements	of	mass	and	stress—there	is	a	homology	here	with	Sellars’	“clash	between	images”.19	Engineer	J.T.	Oden	has	described	this	tyranny	of	scales	problem	by	remarking	that	all	sim-ulation	methods	produced	until	the	beginning	of	the	twenty-first	century	were	valid	solely	for:		 [L]imited	ranges	of	spatial	and	temporal	scales.	Those	conventional	methods,	however,	cannot	cope	with	physical	phenomena	operating	across	large	ranges	of	scale—12	orders	of	magnitude	in	time	scales,	such	as	in	the	modelling	of	protein	folding	or	10	orders	of	magnitude	in	spatial	scales,	such	as	in	the	design	of	advanced	materials.	At	those	ranges,	the	power	of	the	tyranny	of	scales	renders	useless	virtually	all	conventional	methods.	(Oden	2006:	§3.1)		As	 eluded	 to	 earlier,	 in	 the	 last	 two	 decades	we	 have	 developed	 advanced	modelling	schemes	to	resolve	such	discrepancies	by	allowing	RVE	sub-modelling	layers	to	circumscribe	their	descriptive	agenda	to	localized	and	semi-autonomous	“strata”,	or	what	Robert	Batter-man	 (co-opting	 the	 term	 from	 physicist	 Robert	 Laughlin)	 calls	 a	 “protectorate”.20	 These	semi-enclosed	strata/protectorates	are	set	into	communication	with	one-another	through	those	 “coded	messages”	 called	 homogenizations,	 dividing	 linguistic	 labour	 and	moulding	novel	 explanatory	architecture.	Such	a	homogenization	policy	shows	an	 internally	 linked	equilibrium	by	aping	the	physical	manner	in	which	“relatively	simple	forms	of	dominating	behaviour,	characterized	by	a	limited	set	of	descriptive	parameters,	emerge	at	higher	scales	from	their	large,	lower-scale	underpinning”	(Wilson	2018:	219).	Differential	heterogenesis	can,	thus,	be	used	as	a	technical	tool	to	produce	equilibrium	homogeneity.		Given	the	standard	tools	of	Euclidean	geometry,	there	are	considerable	difficulties	in	cap-turing	the	“natural”	notion	of	a	dominant	behaviour	in	precise	terms	that	we	have	attempted	to	counteract.	What	of	the	semantic	terrain?	Like	syntactical	structure,	the	topological	charge	of	any	gradient	field	is	a	problem	of	scales,	but	in	both	examples	a	crucial	consideration	is	




the	problem	of	modelling.	As	elaborated	in	“the	greediness	of	scales”	problem,	scale-focused	modelling	must	utilize	differential	equations	while	contending	with	the	descriptive	demands	of	reaching	down	to	the	infinitesimal	level.	A	differential	equation	model	must	monopolize	all	of	the	lower-size	scales	available	to	reach	the	infinitesimal	level	at	which	these	equations	articulate	 their	 stipulations.	 This	 description	of	 differential	 equations	 gets	 to	 the	 core	 of	Deleuzian	heterogeneity	and	the	difficultly	of	applying	an	ontology	to	amalgamation.21	In-stead,	we	need	a	hybrid	category	that	articulates	the	compossibility	of	passive	synthesis	(mi-crostates	and	their	microeffects)	and	differential	retention	(mnemonic	integration	and	re-distribution).	Wilson’s	project,	broadly	speaking,	outlines	the	working	architectures	of	modern	multi-scalar	modelling	techniques	to	help	us	recognize	the	distortions	and	vagaries	in	“Theory	T	thinking”,	or	theory-as-approximation.	Moving	forward,	we	will	focus	upon	the	difficulties	involved	in	describing	materials	that	reveal	large	amounts	of	significant	structure	at	inter-mediate	size-scales	(e.g.,	the	structural	features	that	distinguish	one	igneous	rock	from	an-other,	or	the	out-of-equilibrium	formations	that	blacksmiths	fold	and	beat	into	steels).	Con-sider,	for	instance,	the	diamond’s	long-lasting	range	of	“frozen	order”,	wherein	there	exist	strong	energetic	barriers	within	the	diamond	that	prevent	it	from	returning	to	low-pressure	graphite,	such	that	it	has	a	long	relaxation	time.	Similarly,	most	solid	materials	display	very	little	inclination	for	maximizing	their	entropies.		If	cognitive	architecture	involves	tacit	adjustments	in	contextual	registers,	what	does	this	mean	for	the	representational	structure	of	the	syntactic	demands	in	question?	Sarti	and	Citti	give	us	an	answer	concerning	the	co-constitution	of	assembly	via	meaning	and	sensibility,	but	we	very	well	might	consider	another	approach,	beginning	with	the	question	of	compres-sive	schemas.	Let	us	take	the	example	of	two	standard	pictorial	modes—TIFF	and	JPEG	for-mats—wherein	the	JPEG	image	is	comprised	of	far	less	data-points	than	the	TIFF	image.	With	the	TIFF	image,	we	see	that	data	is	encoded	on	a	pixel-by-pixel	basis	(with	each	pixel	encoded	independently	of	one	another).	In	the	JPEG	image,	every	pixel’s	front-end	registration	gov-erns	a	 fixed	span	of	back-end	determinacy,	as	if	 the	 individual	pixels	of	 the	TIFF	had	dis-solved,	forming	an	assemblage	based	on	large-scale	(colour-determinate)	hierarchies.	Pars-ing	the	mold	of	the	JPEG	image’s	compressive	scheme,	we	can	construct	an	enactive	scaffold-ing	by	exploiting	contextual	registers;	this	begin	with	a	broad	metric,	Q1,	followed	up	by	finer	grained	metrics,	 Q2,	which	 rely	 upon	 the	 response	 to	Q1.	 This	 process	 follows	 through	 a	nested	array	of	further	queries,	Q3,	Q4,	and	so	on.	Such	interdependencies	unfold	within	a	segregated	front-end	register	(Q1,	Q2,	Q3,..),	followed	by	an	enumeration	on	their	respective	




answers	(A1,	A2,	A3,..).	These	representational	tactics	are	termed	multiple	register	schemes,	where	syntactic	complexity	is	reduced	through	scope	restrictions	via	policies	of	contextual	localization.		Thus,	Wilson	 remarks	 that	 “[p]resent-day	 philosophy	 of	 language	 could	 become	more	supple	if	its	practitioners	more	warmly	appreciated	the	substantive	reductions	in	syntactic	complexity	achievable	through	various	policies	of	contextual	localization”	(9).	A	conception	of	computational	pragmatics	as	such	is	privy	to	responses	to	the	registrations	of	linguistic	capacities	with	respect	to	data	and	reasoning	qua	compression.		The	“greediness	of	scales”	problem	demonstrates	that	hysteresis,	the	microscopic	migra-tion	of	dislocations	that	eventually	results	 in	material	cracks	(i.e.,	 lower-scale	damage	 in-flicted	by	upper-scale	punishment),	can	not	be	illustrated	with	conventional	computational	modelling	through	single-level	descriptive	methods.	While	we	cannot	give	an	account	of	hys-teresis	by	working	upwards	from	the	molecular	scale	in	this	mode,	the	multi-scalar	model	evades	such	computational	barriers	by	enforcing	a	cooperative	division	of	descriptive	labour	amongst	 a	 hierarchy	 of	 RVE-centred	 sub-models,	 each	 of	which	 is	 tasked	with	 capturing	dominant	behaviours	that	arise	within	its	purview.	Thus	and	so,	“each	local	RVE	sub-model	directly	responds	only	to	its	local	environment,	rather	than	to	events	that	arise	within	distant	sectors	or	upon	alternative	size	scales”	(Wilson	2018:	222);	by	stepping	through	the	mathe-matical	filter	of	homogenization,	we	readjust	local	parameters	within	each	RVE	unit	until	the	cascade	of	inter-scalar	reports	is	rendered	self-consistent.	Wilson’s	adaptive	approach	also	emphasizes	how	the	use	of	“wandering	words”	such	as	“force”	or	“use”	precede	firm	referential	semantics;	only	after	applicational	enclosures	are	set	 can	 they	attach	 to	moorings	 suited	 for	novel	modelling	environments	 (Wilson	2006).	Thus,	Wilson	does	not	agree	with	Jerry	Fodor’s	anti-pragmatic	approach	to	meaning	(Fodor’s	








Deleuze	and	Scales		According	to	Deleuze,	 the	assemblage	has	“only	 itself,	 in	connection	with	other	assem-blages	and	in	relation	to	other	bodies	without	organs”	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1983:	4).	De-spite	the	relations	that	any	media	object	may	have	with	its	semblance,	for	instance,	these	relations	are	demanded	by	externality	and	no	such	connections	to	other	entities	fully	desig-nate	its	“being”.	This	is	a	theme	that	we	may	term	poetically	term	“solitude”,	which	becomes	pellucid	in	Deleuze’s	books	on	cinema—such	“solicitude”	is	manifest	when	we	consider	the	structuration	of	cinematic	moving	images.	In	the	“movement-image”,	or	the	pre-World	War	II	cinematic	image,	“vehicles	or	moving	bodies”	are	understood	as	thoroughly	relational—that	is,	they	include	actions,	perceptions,	and	affections	that	hint	at	externality	(or	autonomy	and	materiality)	but	do	not	embrace	it	fully	(Deleuze	1986:	23).	In	the	works	of	Hitchcock,	for	example,	Deleuze	recognizes	that	relations	are	always	designated	along	external	terms	that	constantly	refuse	their	full	implication.	In	the	post-war	“time-image”,	we	see	the	envel-oping	of	incompatible	images,	disjunct	sounds,	and,	consequently,	incompossible	worlds	that	are—through	editing—brought	in-common,	suggesting	the	possibly	of	“an	outside	more	dis-tant	than	an	exterior,	and	that	of	an	inside	deeper	than	any	interior”	(Deleuze	1989;	Klein-herenbrink	 2019:	 54).	 It	 is	 this	 very	 incommensurability,	 the	 inextricable	 Outside	 from	which	emerges	cinematic	malaise,	that	we	see	inaugurated	the	possibility	of	the	impossible,	the	“false	image”	which	makes	manifest	a	“private	reality”	or	the	“virtuality	of	time”	(Gallo-way	2016:	68).	In	Deleuze’s	work	on	cinema,	the	screen’s	moving	images	are	but	metonyms	for	exocentric	frames	of	visual	reference,	evincing	that	perception,	which	is	indivisible,	offers	time	in	a	“pure	state”	(Deleuze	1983:	21;	Deleuze	2005:	96).23		
                                               22		 There	is	a	curious	parallel	between	Wilson’s	cyclic	description	of	our	regenerative	linguistic	formulations,	“condemned	to	wobble	between	seasons	of	brash	inferential	extension	and	epochs	of	qualified	retrench-ment	later	on”	and	André	Leroi-Gourhan’s	notion	of	the	evolutional	chaîne	opératoire	(Wilson	2018:	32).	According	to	Leroi-Gourhan,	“[f]or	each	species	a	cycle	is	established	between	its	technical	ability	(its	body)	and	its	ability	to	organize	itself	(its	brain).	Within	this	cycle,	through	economy	of	design,	a	way	opens	up	toward	increasingly	pertinent	selective	adaptation”	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993:	60).		23		 Thus,	the	differential	can	also	be	identified	with	the	process	of	watching	cinema,	whereby	Bergson’s	élan	




This	inextricable	Outside,	as	a	functor	of	the	externality	thesis,	transpires	most	markedly	in	observations	from	lived	experience,	where	the	relation	of	signs-to-denotata	is	processed	through	 the	 “sensory	motor	 schema”	 as	 something	 akin	 to	 the	 causally-connected	 filmic	script	of	the	movement-image,	or	“cine-thinking”	(Alliez	2000).	To	inscribe	this	lesson	once	more,	we	can	 turn	 to	 those	examples	 in	visual	 art	 that	 actively	 engage	with	 the	plane	of	presentation	and	exigent	construction	as,	for	example,	in	Marcel	Duchamp’s	“Fountain”	read-ymade,	which:		does	not	need	its	‘R.	Mutt’	signature	in	order	to	exist,	nor	does	L.H/O.O.Q.	need	the	moustache	added	to	Mona	Lisa.	The	parts	of	an	entity	are	always	somewhat	redundant,	a	complex	notion	[...,	which]	reveal(s)	that	objects	have	no	natural	place,	function,	or	meaning.	There	is	nothing	external	consti-tuting	their	essence.	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	57)		What	does	this	have	to	do	with	multi-scalar	modelling?	Deleuze’s	overall	theory	of	ma-chines	is	fundamentally	flat,	discontinuous,	and	infrastructural,	as	Deleuzean	externality	is	premised	 upon	 irreducibility.	 Similarly,	 Wilson	 demonstrates	 the	 tyranny	 of	 reduction,	whether	it	be	an	ontology	(“Theory	T	thinking”),	modelling	(the	hyperbolic	notions	of	evolu-tionary	modelling),	or	semantics	(the	inferential	expectations	moored	to	words	like	“cause”).	In	 opposition	 to	 Platonism,	or	 internalism—which	 results	 from	 the	 private	 depth	 of	ma-chines	being	irreducible	to	and	unique	in	kind	from	their	actualizations—our	fundamental	error	of	 thinking,	 according	 to	Deleuze,	 is	 to	 conflate	 the	 contiguity,	 identity,	 and	 resem-blance	 characterizing	 actuality	 as	 also	 characterizing	 “things-in-themselves”.	 Therefore,	“every	entity	is	itself	a	machine,	in	the	sense	of	being	a	causally	effective	agent	that	makes	its	own	difference	in	the	world”	where	each	entity	has	its	own	unique	“complex	inner	working”	(Kleinherenbrink	2019:	7).	For	Deleuze,	machines	can	have	actualizations	that	are	not	themselves	machines	but	in-stead	translations	or	scalar	measurements	of	 the	being	of	a	machine	 into	the	experiential	content	of	another	machine.	Consider,	for	instance,	how	Duchamp’s	readymade	teaches	us	that	entities	are	obstinate	assemblages	and	that	all	entities	are,	consequently,	 irreducible	machines	that	can	function	smoothly	with	others	(if	the	proper	operations	are	exacted).	That	is,	the	“natural	condition”,	which	is	pre-observational,	is	that	of	the	straited	space;	it	is	the	necessity	 imposition	 of	 a	 scientific	 system	 and/or	 systematic	 scale/measurement	 that	mends	any	and	all	aforementioned	entities	together	within	scientific	unity.	Nonetheless,	this	irreducibility	 does	 not	 necessitate	 an	 ultimate	 hierarchy	or	 end-point—for	were	 this	 the	case,	all	entities	would	be	self-identical	and,	thus,	reducible	to	themselves.	Deleuze’s	ecology	of	the	assemblage,	a	synonym	for	“machine”,	designates	how	any	system	emerges	from	rela-tions	between	heterogenous	parts.	Deleuze’s	world	of	externality	is	one	in	which	“no	two	











each	with	its	own	mechanisms	of	torture,	atrocious	creativities,	rules	and	problems”	(Negar-estani	2009:	78).	However,	as	Deleuze’s	system	matures,	 it	 further	accounts	 for	a	supple-mentary	 account	 of	 subjectification,	 wherein	 an	 appeal	 to	 the	 “encounter”	 ensures	 the	“measure	of	fit”	between	transcendental	empiricism	as	a	constructivist	mathematism	of	con-cepts	and	the	world	of	intensive,	actual	difference.	Deleuze’s	transcendental	empiricism	of	inscribed	difference	thus	offers	a	positive	value,	rather	than	abiding	by	the	earlier	“law	of	the	negative”,	or	“negative	determination	of	the	body	qua	belonging	which	is	imposed	by	the	Ideal”	(Negarestani	2009:	78-79).	It	frees	dif-ference	from	its	(historical)	subordination	to	the	indeterminate	homogeneity	of	the	Platonic	composition	of	identity,	whereby	the	parts	of	a	whole	are	established	and	identified	as	the	whole,	 itself,	 a	 priori.	 Thus,	 the	 Deleuzian	 differential	 is	 based	 on	 difference	 “in	 itself”	(Deleuze	1994:	28).	Consequently,	the	Deleuzean	correlative	of	the	a	priori	of	form	and	substance	becomes	phenomenologically	cross-constituted	by	the	envisages	of	a	body	and	its	embedded	world.	As	a	result,	both	respond	to	the	uncertain	solicitations	of	a	milieu	that	instructs	its	rhythms,	behaviors,	and	sensitive	qualities.	Following	Deleuze,	the	co-constitution	of	sensible	quali-ties	are,	by	construction,	not	those	of	sensation	(as	affect	theory	would	have	us	believe)	but	intrinsic	signification.24	The	sensible,	from	the	very	beginning,	is	provided	with	a	meaning,	which	is	assigned	by	the	corporeal	matrix	which	institutes	it	(rather	than	its	specific	sign).		Beyond	navigating	the	differential	qua	coherence	vis-à-vis	behavioural	 fidelity	 to	 layer	orientation	and	interface-limited	hierarchical	behavioural	dependencies,	by	gleaning	Wilson	we	have	surreptitiously	also	tried	to	create	a	bricolage	with	Deleuze’s	machine	ontology	and	ontological	commitments	of	the	Quinean	ilk	which	are	also	demarcated	by	the	possibility	of	re-alignment.	I	argue	that	this	is	not	a	misreading	of	Deleuze’s	machine	ontology,	for	Deleuze	denies	 the	possibility	of	an	ultimate	Mechanosphere	that	captures	all	relations;	Deleuze’s	externality	necessarily	cannot	be	reduced	into	exhaustive	organic	or	biological	relations,	as	external	entities	are	not	self-caused	or	reducible	to	anything	else.	Deleuzean	externality	is	premised	upon	irreducibility.	Wilson’s	ontology	contends	with	the	Quinean	thesis	that	our	“ontological	commitments”	should	be	determined	by	assembling	our	various	worldly	claims	into	a	unified	theory	(much	like	the	machine	ontology)	but	surveys	any	amalgamated	corpus	for	 varied	 existential	 claims—sentences	of	 the	 form	 (∃x)α—that,	meanwhile,	 relationally	adapts.	Let	us	briefly	remark	on	relational	adaptation	of	media	and	behavioral	use.	Stiegler’s	work	on	technics	and	time	introduces	the	tertiary	retention	to	Husserlian	phenomenology	by	re-marking	upon	how	the	media	artefact	bears	a	transcendental	responsibility	within	our	“gen-eral	 organology”.	 This	 “lost	 limb”	 is	 a	 supplement	 in	 the	 Derridean	 sense:	 both	 an	


















wielder,	 computer-programmer,	 and	 so	 on).26	 This	 always	 observationally	appears	 to	 be	causally	construed.	As	René	Thom’s	work	on	topological	structural	stability	indicates,	we,	as	predators	situatedness	in	space,	are	constrained	to	an	allocentric	view	of	embeddedness	that	we	relate	to	through	causality—"we	believe	in	causality	because	we	have	been	conditioned	phylogenetically	to	do	so	by	the	regularity	with	which	phenomena	succeed	one	another	in	the	physical	world”	(Thom	1990:	7).		In	Sarti	and	Citti’s	work	on	the	intersection	on	“non-vanishing	sums”,	matter	is	situated	
outside	the	realm	of	knowledge,	“simply	because	knowledge	is	concerned	only	with	the	rela-tions	of	‘cohesion,’”	while,	simultaneously,	“matter	is	nonetheless	conceptualizable,	for,	be-ing	therefore	liable	to	‘receive’	forms,	it	must	indeed	have	qualities	that	ensure	its	reception”	(Sarti	et	al.	2019:	16-17).27	As	in	cinema	voyeurism	and	multiscalar	modelling,	differential	Deleuzianism	allows	us	to	readily	conceive	of	that	which	is	devoid	of	form	or	homogeneous	reference	in	bottom-up	or	top-down	direction,	scaling	its	way	not	only	out	of	knowledge	but	out	of	any	referential/observational	purview	(i.e.,	“out	of	sight”)	until	homogenized.	In	turn,	differential	 heterogenesis	 allows	 us	 to	 resituate	 the	 contingent-becoming	 of	 the	 a	 priori,	which	was	provincially	occluded	by	Kant’s	understanding	of	the	self-substantiating	and	al-ready-present	“at	hand”	analytic.		Sarti	and	Citti’s	analysis	of	progressive	polarization	in	heterogenetic	flows	invigorates	a	kind	of	dynamic	evolution	where	a	virtual	topos	is	revealed	to	underly	the	configuration	of	the	virtual.	Thus,	the	virtual	is	abducted	by	the	noumenal	real,	where	it	finds	itself	anchored	by	an	ontogenetic	identity-relation.	No	longer	are	we	circumscribed	to	the	province	of	real	numbers	and	the	stable	conditions	of	cognition,	as	in	Kant’s	system	of	pure	intuiting.	Instead,	differential	heterogenesis	galvanizes	Solomon	Maïmon’s	criticism	of	Kant	for	being	unable	to	provide	for	any	account	of	how	genesis	facilitates	the	conditions	of	knowledge.	Mathematicians	such	as	Bernard	Teissier,	Giuseppe	Longo	and	Jean	Petitot	have	examined	phylogenetically-conditioned	causality	as	it	concerns	continuous	computation	(returning	to	the	problems	riddling	Turing’s	continuous	state-machine).	For	instance,	in	Teissier’s	work	on	“Protomathematics,	Perception	and	the	Meaning	of	Mathematical	Objects”	(1996),	we	see	how	it	may	be	possible	to	claim	that	the	evolution	of	our	perceptual	systems	has	created	an	isomorphism	between	the	visual	 line	and	the	vestibular	 line.	This	(geodesic)	mark	of	 the	discrete	demonstrates	the	stronghold	of	internalist-representationalist	habituation,	where	functionally-unmoored	 causality	 seems	 to	 impart	 us	 with	 imagining	 the	 non-human,	 a	terrain	that	creeps	beyond	“[t]he	regularity	with	which	phenomena	succeed	one	another	in	




the	physical	world”	(Thom	1990:	7).	We	can	create	a	bricolage	here	if,	for	instance,	we	do	not	 accept	 that	 any	 phenomena’s	 “being	 caused”	 by	 certain	 stimuli	 is	 equipollent	 to	constituting	 phenomenal	 characters	 (e.g.,	 colour	 experiences).28	What,	 then,	 if	 we	 apply	differential	 heterogenesis	 to	 abduct	 the	 principles	 of	 human	 cognition	 and	 transmogrify	them	 so	 as	 to	 produce	 a	 proto-perceptual	 theory	 of	 retroactive	 observation,	 considering	what	Ned	Block	terms	“mental	paint”	in	order	to	schematically	imagine	the	differential	in	terms	of	quantum	computing/computing	in	continua.	Is	there	any	relation,	then,	between	the	 feed-forward	adequation	of	deep	 learning	and	non-accessible	 (and	non-phenomenal)	properties	behind	externalism	(i.e.,	what	Ned	Block	terms	“mental	oil”)?29	Such	problems	bear	further	consideration.	This	differential	consideration	of	truth-contingency	gives	us	a	computational	corollary	for	challenging	paradigms	of	causality.	According	to	Lev	Manovich,	it	is	the	causal	narrative	that,	as	a	cultural	object,	 foregrounds	the	 logical	perturbations	underlying	algorithms,	web	 in-dexes,	computer	storage,	CD-ROM’s,	web	sites,	and	other	new	media	objects	which	are	“or-ganized	as	databases”	 (Manovich	1999:	85).	Manovich’s	model	of	 causality	 considers	 the	“storage-and-retrieval”	modality	as	our	epochal	archetype,	for	“the	computer	age	brought	with	it	a	new	cultural	algorithm:	reality	à	media	à	data	à	database”	(85).	However,	today’s	machines	are	not	characterized	by	linear	causality	but	stochastic	elasticity—consider	Pre-dictive	Processing	algorithms,	approximate	Bayes	optimality,	Markov	chains,	Hopfield	Net-works,	Boltzmann	machines,	and	so	on.30		A	short	survey	of	cybernetic	history	designates	the	classical	Church-Turing	thesis’	“com-putable	reals”	and	first-order	cybernetics’	treatment	of	information	as	stilted	on	the	closed	loop	 of	 “storage-and-retrieval”.	 In	 both	 instances,	 autopoiesis	 takes	 on	 a	 radical	








maps,	and	procedural	dynamics	into	a	“persistent	dynamic	simulation,	which	can	be	used	to	continuously	 predict	 perceptual	 patterns	 at	 our	 systemic	 interface	 to	 the	 environment”	(Bach	2018:	4).	As	 in	Predictive	Processing,	 the	processing	 stream	of	bottom-up	cuing	of	perceptual	hypotheses	(such	as	objects	or	situations)	is	matched	by	a	“topdown	verification”	of	these	hypotheses	(through	the	simulative	capacity	of	the	neocortex),	where	the	“binding	of	 the	 features”	 is	 cohesively	modelled.	Research	 concerning	our	neural	 cortical	 columns	shows	that	it	here	that	we	model	compositional	approximation	and	reward	distribution,	as	is	the	case	with	inductive	machine	learning,	but	our	brain	can	still	perform	most	of	its	func-tions	without	the	presence	of	the	conductor	(Bodovitz	2008,	Safavi	2014,	Del	Cul	2009).31	Severed	from	our	cortical	conductors,	the	functor	between	our	neuroplasticity	and	machine	learning’s	processual	input,	“we	are	sleep	walkers”,	capable	of	coordinated	perceptual	and	motor	action,	but	without	central	coherence	and	reflection	(Bach	2018:	4).	Bayesian	interpretations	of	cognition	suggest	that,	as	we	contract	events	and	repetitions,	we	are	 simultaneously	optimizing	our	predictive	model;	 at	 the	 infinitesimal	 scale,	Bach’s	“cortical	conductor	theory”	evinces	that	the	formal-computational	reformulation	of	induc-tive	reasoning	can	persist	beyond	 the	stronghold	of	prior	probability	metrics.	Differential	heterogenesis	thus	provides	us	with	a	dialectical	method	to	contract	these	ideas	into	virtual	relation	and	a	naturalized	“scientific	image”.	Further	considerations,	which	we	do	not	pos-sess	the	prolixity	to	attend	to	at	this	time	but	which	my	dear	colleagues	have	prudently	en-deavored	over	with	their	incisive	philosophical	scalpels,	are	elaborately	examined	in	this	is-sue	of	La	Deleuziana.	For	 instance,	one	would	be	wise	to	 turn	to	“Escaping	the	Network”,	where	Anna	Longo	takes	up	evolutionary	game	theory	as	a	framework	to	move	beyond	the	biological	modelling	of	populations,	considering	the	“network	society”	vide	complexification	through	technologically-tethered	normative	schemes	of	action.				
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